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Previous research suggests that client politics shape national migration laws in that they 
converge towards more liberal regulations. An examination of recently released cross-country 
data suggests, however, that there is little support for either convergence or generally more 
open policies. Trying to shed light on this empirical puzzle, I argue that democratic 
policymakers have incentives to listen to, and pursue policies that are favored by, the 
“unorganized” electorate as well, since this maximizes their chances of staying in power. 
However, due to the influence of client interests that work against the public’s view on 
migration, a positive effect should only materialize under more salient circumstances, i.e., 
when the inflow of foreign-born individuals is high. I analyze these expectations 
quantitatively using data that combine information on national migration policies with all 
European Social Survey rounds in 2002-2016. I find robust and significant support for public 
opinion influencing domestic immigration laws, but this effect only emerges with rather large 
migrant and refugee populations in the country. 
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The movement of people across borders has risen significantly over the last few decades. 
According to the United Nations (2015), the total population of international migrants, i.e., 
people residing in a country other than their country of birth, has more than doubled since the 
year 2000 to about 244 million by 2015. The scale of international migration makes it a 
global phenomenon, a “fundamental driver of social, economic, and political change” 
(Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 99) affecting each state worldwide. Leaving a country to 
live in another state abroad is determined by multiple forces (for overviews, see, e.g., 
Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 100ff; Breunig, Cao, and Luedtke 2012; Alarian and 
Wallace Goodman 2017) that are commonly categorized as push (e.g., poor economic 
conditions in the country of origin) and pull factors (e.g., freer forms of government or better 
economic opportunities in potential host states). Permanently moving to another country 
offers valuable gains for both migrants and their host societies, including economic growth 
(see, e.g., Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 103f; Dustmann and Frattini 2014; Hainmueller, 
Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2017); but states can also experience a number of challenges 
related to the supply of goods and services when trying to manage large population inflows. 
In light of this, laws, controls, and policies are necessary instruments for governments to 
regulate migration.  
How are states’ migration policies formed and influenced? There is a substantive body of 
works studying the determinants of migration laws and regulations (for overviews, see, e.g., 
Meyers 2000; Money 2010; Abou-Chadi 2016; Koopmans and Michalowski 2017; Helbling 
and Kalkum 2018; see also Joppke 2003; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Hansen and Köhler 
2005; Howard 2006; Sassen 2008). To a large degree, a consensus seems to have emerged in 
this literature, which highlights two major trends. First, migration policies, particularly across 
democracies, converge (e.g., Freeman 1995; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Sassen 2008). 
3 
 
National governments largely retain control over their migration laws and regulations, but 
international and globalization influences such as the European Union (and here, most 
prominently, the Schengen Agreement) increasingly shape these policies and align them (see 
also Lahav 2004: 1153; Money 2010). Second, over the course of this convergence process, 
client politics are the main driver and induce more liberal rules. While (unorganized) public 
opinion may not necessarily prefer more open migration regulations and, in fact, generally 
opposes existing immigration levels  (e.g., Citrin et al. 1997; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; 
Kessler and Freeman 2005; Sides and Citrin 2007; Howard 2009, 2010; Breunig et al. 2012; 
Abou-Chadi 2016), (democratic) governments do not translate these preferences into policies, 
but instead follow more organized, client interests that favor open, less restrictive policies on 
migration (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999; Beck and Camarota 2002; Sassen 2008; see also 
Lahav 2004; Facchini and Mayda 2008). In the words of Abou-Chadi (2016: 2092; see also 
Givens and Luedtke 2005), “a law-making process behind closed doors with as little public 
attention as possible should generally favor liberalizing change.” These two patterns have 
crucial implications for our understanding of countries’ migration laws, how they are formed, 
and what consequences they have. 
However, systematic, cross-country analyses have been rather the exception than the rule 
due to the lack of high-quality data covering a large set of countries over a longer period of 
time (see also Freeman 1995: 887; Meyers 2000; Lahav 2004: 1178; Money 2010; Abou-
Chadi 2016: 2087).1 Recently released information on national policies from the Immigration 
Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project (Helbling et al. 2017; see also Helbling and Kalkum 
2018) addresses this shortcoming – but, perhaps surprisingly, these data do not seem to 
support the literature’s two major trends outlined above. Figure 1 depicts the restrictiveness 
levels of states’ internal immigration controls and regulations as taken from the IMPIC data 
 
1 And even existing studies trying to overcome such limitations cover a limited number of states, e.g., Givens 
and Luedtke (2005) focus on three countries, while Abou-Chadi’s (2016) analysis is based on 11 democracies. 
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for all countries in my sample between 2002 and 2016. Contrary to what existing work may 
expect, state policies in Figure 1 are characterized by a significant amount of variation (non-
convergence) and several countries have rather restrictive policies (non-openness). 2 
Ultimately, there is apparently little evidence for a “liberal bias” (Money 2010) in 
immigration policies. 
Figure 1. Internal Immigration Polices, 2002-2016 
 
Note: Graph is based on internal immigration policy controls and regulations as defined by the Immigration 
Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project (Helbling et al. 2017). The data set is described in the research-design 
section below. Data in 2011-2016 are linearly interpolated. 
 
The following article seeks to shed light on this puzzle by providing new theoretical and 
empirical answers to why immigration laws may not necessarily converge and are less open. 
Two main scholarly contributions are made to this end. First, I develop an argument that (re-) 
emphasizes the importance of public opinion (see also Facchini and Mayda 2008) – the 
“unorganized interest.” Focusing on a sample of democracies, I contend that democratic 
 
2 This also mirrors Lahav’s (2004) study of EU immigration policy outcomes and Abou-Chadi’s (2016: 2089) 
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governments have incentives to pursue policies that are favored by the larger public in order 
to maximize their chances of staying in power (see also Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). 
Domestic immigration policies are unlikely to be an exception here and, in fact, can be 
influenced by the public’s attitude. However, due to the impact of the more organized client 
interests that work against the unorganized, mean voter’s view on migration, a positive effect 
is more likely to materialize only under more salient circumstances (see also Howard 2009, 
2010; Abou-Chadi 2016), i.e., when the inflow of migrants and refugees is large. Empirically, 
I combine public opinion data on migration attitudes of all rounds of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) with the recently released IMPIC data (Helbling et al. 2017) on domestic 
migration policies in 2002-2016. My results present evidence for the impact of client 
interests, but also for the influence of public opinion that exerts a significant and positive 
effect on the degree of restrictiveness of internal migration policy controls and regulations. 
The less open the public is about immigration, the more restrictive are national migration 
laws. However, a careful examination shows that this effect only emerges with rather large 
foreign-born populations in the country. In states with few migrants and refugees, public 
opinion does not have a significant effect on policy outputs, which suggests that the link of 
citizens’ attitudes and national policies only becomes relevant in situations in which 
migration is, in fact, a salient issue.  
These findings emphasize that both factors – client interests and the less organized public 
– are at work and can shape migration policies, but the former largely cancels out the latter 
until a salient point is reached at which the influence stemming from public opinion takes 
over – the public can no longer be “ignored” and is then more influential. This result not only 
explains previous findings in the literature pointing to the importance of client politics, but 
also the trends toward less convergence and more restrictiveness Figure 1 above depicts (see 
also Lahav 2004; Abou-Chadi 2016). Ultimately, my research offers crucial implications and 
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contributions to policy and scholastic circles. Most importantly, I demonstrate that 
governments can and do respond to a broader spectrum of the electorate, not necessarily the 
more organized, client interests, in the context of migration policies. I discuss these 
implications in the conclusion. 
 
Theory: Client Politics, Public Opinion, and Issue Salience 
In general, I focus on public opinion’s role for immigration policymaking when contending 
that policymakers have incentives to legislate laws and regulations that reflect public 
demand. But what are the underlying mechanisms behind this? And is this effect conditional 
on some moderating influence? First, it is frequently assumed that democratic leaders have a 
strong incentive of retaining power. When subscribing to this, second, democratic 
governments may want to introduce policies that favor the domestic audience. In turn, third, 
if the public mood is more skeptical of migration, the executive could want to introduce more 
restrictive migration controls and regulations, since this will improve the chances of staying 
in power, i.e., doing well in the next election. However, imposing restrictions on immigration 
also induces costs, primarily as less open policies go against what the more organized, client 
interest wants. Hence, legislating more restrictive laws and regulations may only be more 
likely if the general, less organized public can no longer be ignored – and this may rather be 
given in the more salient cases when sufficiently large foreign-born populations in a country 
exist. In the following, I develop these arguments in detail. 
Democratic institutions and the procedures of leader selection in these regimes incentivize 
governments to respond to constituents’ needs (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). The 
primary mechanism behind this is that democratic leaders can be removed more easily from 
office than their non-democratic counterparts due to, e.g., regular elections, and this 
constrains democratic governments’ policy choices (Breunig et al. 2012: 830). Democratic 
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politicians thus have more incentives than other leaders to implement policies that favor their 
voters (Dahl 1971; see also Mirolovic 2010; Breunig et al. 2012: 830f). However, 
democracies have larger winning coalitions (i.e., those who control enough power to keep a 
leader in office), and the relative cost of providing private goods to these individuals as a 
means of maintaining power is therefore higher, too. As a result, democratic leaders tend to 
provide public goods to retain power – and immigration control and regulation, which is 
usually seen as a public good (Freeman 1995: 885), is unlikely to be an exception. 
But how do democratic politicians supply public goods in line with voters’ preferences? 
Put differently, how can public opinion actually influence policymaking? As indicated, 
democracies provide the opportunity for citizens to influence politics via multiple channels 
including casting their vote in elections. Since politicians are concerned about votes and can 
choose their policies accordingly in order to maximize chances to do well in the next 
election, they will adopt policy platforms that are closer to the ideal policies of the public 
(Downs 1957; see also Ezrow 2010). This, in turn, should lead to a greater provision of 
public goods desired by the general audience, i.e., more restrictive policies if the public 
demands this. Evidence for the responsiveness of democratic governments to voters’ 
demands does exist (e.g., Ezrow 2010) and, even in the context of EU initiatives on 
immigration, Lahav (2004: 1152) suggests that policies can “broadly reflect public opinion.”3 
However, the influence of client interests remains an issue. In light of previous work 
finding evidence for its impact (e.g., Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999; Beck and Camarota 2002; 
Sassen 2008; see also Facchini and Mayda 2008), it seems implausible that migration laws 
and regulations are exclusively and continuously based on public demand (see also 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In fact, 
“immigration policy making has long been made in the absence of public debate” (Lahav 
 
3 However, Lahav’s (2004) analysis is of rather descriptive nature without a direct test of or systematic evidence 
for a link between public attitudes and policymaking. 
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2004: 1153) and “voters’ vote choice is only affected by the issues that they perceive as 
salient” (Abou-Chadi 2016: 2094). I therefore argue that public opinion and client interests 
exert an influence, but the latter largely cancels out the former due to opposing effects, all 
else equal. Instead, public attitudes toward migration must somehow be enhanced, enforced, 
or “activated” (see also Howard 2009, 2010; Abou-Chadi 2016: 2088), which induces that 
only in times of issue salience is it more likely that the public affects democratic 
governments and their policy outputs strongly and exerts an impact that can be clearly 
distinguished from client interests (Wlezien 1995; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Bélanger and 
Meguid 2008).  
That is, policy change in most issue areas is usually incremental and attention not focused 
at the macro level (Mazey and Richardson 2006). In the context of a complex interplay of the 
more organized client interests and the less organized public, however, issues might break 
through to the macro-political realm of elected politicians if voters – and, in turn, 
policymakers – perceive something as extremely salient (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Bélanger 
and Meguid 2008). This mirrors Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005: 105) who emphasize that 
immigration as a policy issue has the potential to mobilize the electorate under certain 
conditions. That is, so that major policymaking can occur in favor of the general attitude, 
some factor pushing the influence of public opinion over client interests is necessary. I argue 
that issue salience can be such a moderating influence – a factor that “activates” public 
opinion (Howard 2009, 2010; see also Givens and Luedtke 2005) and policymakers can no 
longer (afford to) ignore what the larger public wants (see also Abou-Chadi 2016: 2092; 
Bélanger and Meguid 2008).  
Leaders tend to process issues sequentially (Walgrave and Dejaeghere 2016) and 
“pressure” has to build up for policy change to happen. That is, to break through politicians’ 
attention thresholds requires a positive feedback process. Public opinion and issue salience 
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positively feed-back off each other until regulations are implemented that reflect public 
demand to address the issue at hand. Salience generally pertains to the importance of an 
issue, being a function of the scale of that matter, how likely it is that the public is affected by 
it (and will care about it), and public debate extended (see also Abou-Chadi 2016: 2092; see 
also Givens and Luedtke 2005). The actual size of foreign-born populations seems to fit these 
criteria: “hostility to immigration is correlated with the visibility of new migration inflows” 
(Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 105). I contend accordingly that issue salience increases 
with the size of the migrant and refugee population in the country (see also Ugur 1995; 
Money 2010). Conversely, issue salience is likely to be low if there is only a small foreign-
born population.4  
Broad public support for specific migration controls and regulations in combination with 
high issue salience are not necessary for an agenda breakthrough, but they add weight to 
other forces at work pushing against policy inertia or client interests (Jones and Baumgartner 
2012). Thus, more salient circumstances should facilitate that public attitudes, independent 
and different from client politics, exert an influence on policymaking. This explains, for 
example, that the UK raised the level of restrictiveness of its migration laws after a 
significant inflow of foreign-born individuals in the 1990s (Givens and Luedtke 2005: 5). On 
the other hand, low issue salience combined with little public demand for migration policy 
restrictions makes it more likely that client politics affects decision-making and can 
effectively push for more liberal policies  (Givens and Luedtke 2005: 7; Hansen and Köhler 
2005; Abou-Chadi 2016: 2092).  
Ultimately, I expect that only when migration is a salient issue, i.e., when the foreign-born 
population is large, policymakers have stronger incentives to reply to the broader public’s 
 
4 Similarly, Lahav (2004: 1162f) emphasizes that “knowing the number of immigrants in a country tells us a 
great deal about people’s attitudes […], because perceptions clearly have some reality base.” According to 
Lahav (2004: 1167, 1171) “substantial immigrant populations” equal high issue salience. Givens and Luedtke 
(2005: 9f) state that policy responds to “the actual societal presence of immigrants,” and Koopmans and 
Michalowski (2017: 61) contend that “larger immigrant populations could be perceived as more threatening.” 
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demand, and less favorable attitudes toward migration will then be associated with more 
restrictive migration laws and regulations.  
 
Research Design 
To test my theoretical expectations, I have compiled a data set comprising information on 
immigration policies, public opinion on migration, transnational population movements, and 
a series of control variables for a sample of established, mostly European democracies 
between 2002 and 2016. The sample’s country-time coverage is driven by data availability of 
the core variables of interest, most crucially public opinion as the European Social Survey 
(ESS) is only available as of 2002.5 The country-year is the unit of analysis in this time-series 
cross-sectional data set. All explanatory items are temporally lagged by one year to minimize 
problems stemming from endogeneity, while variables’ values in years not included in the 
ESS between 2002 and 2016 are linearly interpolated. With these specifications, there are 25 
countries in my sample (see also Figure 1 above). 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is based on the IMPIC project, which codes national immigration 
policies, i.e., regulations, controls, and laws that “regulate legal access to a state’s territory” 
(Koopmans and Michalowski 2017: 42), across four dimensions (labor migration, asylum, 
family reunification, and co-ethics) in OECD countries between 1980 and 2010.6 Helbling et 
al. (2017) comprehensively review and assess available data sets on immigration and 
citizenship policies and show that the IMPIC data is the most suitable for cross-country 
comparisons over time due to their focus on the absolute levels of restrictions. The IMPIC 
data make a broad distinction between regulations and control mechanisms, internally and 
 
5 Note that I also cannot cover all states included in the ESS, as the Immigration Policies in Comparison 
(IMPIC) project is more limited. 
6 Available online at: http://www.impic-project.eu. As indicated, values in 2011-2016 are linearly interpolated. 
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externally, while regulations refer to eligibility, conditions, status, and rights. In each area, 
the IMPIC project measures on a quasi-continuous scale between 0 and 1 how restrictive a 
policy is.  
For this study, I constructed an aggregated variable for internal controls and regulations, 
i.e., this item averages values across all internal items in the IMPIC data set to capture the 
mean level of restrictiveness of internal immigration policies in a country. Internal 
regulations pertain to, for example, the security of foreign-born individuals’ status or their 
rights in a country (e.g., free movement or benefits granted), while internal controls are about 
identification documents or authorities’ oversight. This variable, Immigration Policies, has a 
mean value of 0.529 in my sample, suggesting that immigration restrictions are historically 
above the theoretical average and I use it in the main models below, but also summarize a 
disaggregated analysis that focuses on controls and regulations, respectively, in the appendix. 
Considering the scale of this dependent variable, I employ OLS regression models. Next 
to the substantive predictors, fixed effects for countries and years are included in all models 
to capture any time-invariant, unit-level forms of cross-section heterogeneity or system-wide 
shocks affecting all countries equally. Most political institutions that previous work has 
identified as important drivers of migration policy outputs (e.g., Abou-Chadi 2016) do not 
vary over time in my sample and Lahav (2004: 1170) also highlights country-specific 
contexts such as the status as a former colonial power (Koopmans and Michalowski 2017) or 
national identity (Money 2010). Moreover, the European refugee and migration crisis that 
broke out in 2015 could be one of those temporal shocks and the year fixed effects address 
this. I also incorporate a temporally lagged dependent variable to control for a state’s 
restrictiveness of immigration policies in the previous year. Given the time-series cross-
section structure of the data, serially correlated errors within countries might be possible and 
12 
 
the temporally lagged dependent variable controls for this (Beck 2001). There is also a 
theoretical rationale: a lagged dependent variable captures path-dependence processes.  
 
Main Explanatory Variables 
For the independent variables, first, I employ the integrated data files of all eight rounds of 
the ESS between 2002 and 2016. The ESS is one of the most methodologically rigorous 
cross-national survey projects. While being similar to other European surveys such as the 
Eurobarometer, the ESS’s key advantage is that survey practices are harmonized to reduce 
the likelihood of different results between countries being driven by alterations in how the 
survey is conducted in each state. To this end, the ESS has developed strict guidelines for 
consistent methods of fieldwork, including contacting, coding, and the implementation of 
random sampling, which are all enforced by a central committee. These practices require, 
among others, a random sampling design of residents 15 years and older (no quota sampling), 
one hour face-to-face interviews, a target response rate of 70 percent, and a minimum of 
2,000 respondents per country. These characteristics make the ESS particularly useful for my 
purposes. For a discussion of the ESS data, see de Vries (2017). 
I employ the ESS survey question “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by 
people coming to live here from other countries?” Respondents could assess this on a 0-10 
scale with higher values pertaining more strongly to “a better place to live.” I first deleted all 
individuals who have not responded to this question or expressed no opinion (“do not know”) 
before inverting this item so that higher values stand for less favorable attitudes toward 
migrants and refugees. Afterwards, I aggregated this individual-level variable to the macro, 
country level by averaging across respondents. The final variable measures the public, 
average-voter mood toward migration in each country-year between 2002 and 2016, and it 
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theoretically ranges between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating that public opinion sees 
migration less favorably. 
Issue salience, my second main explanatory variable, is based on data from the World 
Bank Development Indicators for the total population size (or stock) of international migrants 
and refugees in a country. The World Bank defines the international migrant and refugee 
stock as “the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. It also 
includes refugees.” The data underlying this item were originally obtained from national 
population censuses as well as states’ statistics on foreign-born (people who have residence 
in one country, but were born in another country) or foreign populations (people who are 
citizens of a country other than the country in which they reside). Hence, this variable 
captures the entire population of foreign-born individuals in a state. The final variable is log-
transformed due to the rather skewed distribution of the original item. While I focus on 
absolute levels of the foreign-born population, note that all results presented in the following 
and the appendix are robust when employing changes in the migrant population, i.e., foreign-
born population growth or inflows. 
Finally, I include a multiplicative, interaction term between Public Opinion and Total 
Immigration (ln) to examine whether and how a country’s immigration population as a 
measure of issue salience can moderate the impact of public opinion on national migration 
controls and regulations.  
 
Controls 
I also include a series of controls, which may affect the dependent variable via alternative 
channels other than public opinion to avoid omitted variable bias. I primarily follow earlier 
studies that have a similar focus as my work (see, e.g., Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; 
Hansen and Köhler 2005; Howard 2006; Joppke 2003; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Sassen 
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2008; Abou-Chadi 2016) and eventually identified the following variables that seem 
exogenous to the dependent variable, that control for alternative mechanisms influencing the 
introduction of policy, and that may well be correlated with the core predictors. First, based 
on the argument that immigration policies and their level of restrictiveness converge over 
time (e.g., Freeman 1995; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Sassen 2008), I have created a spatial 
variable measuring the average degree of all states’ level of restrictiveness in the previous 
year. Due to my focus on mostly European states, I do not weigh countries’ migration 
controls and regulations by, e.g., contiguity or geographical proximity. If the convergence 
argument applies and international forces lead to more and more similar migration policies 
across national borders (see, e.g., Sassen 2008), we will identify a positive and significant 
effect stemming from this spatial variable denoted Wy: Immigration Policiest-1, i.e., more 
restrictiveness abroad increases the level of restrictiveness “at home.” However, equally 
likely may be a free-riding effect in that states systematically lower their restrictiveness levels 
in response to more controls and restrictive regulations abroad. If this alternative mechanism 
is valid, the effect of Wy: Immigration Policiest-1 would be negatively signed and statistically 
significant.  
Second, the general left-right mean (or median) voter position can be a predictor of 
attitudes toward migration. The more “conservative” or “right” the general public is, the less 
likely it will be that it is in favor of migration. The ESS provides the following survey item to 
measure individuals’ left-right self-placement: “people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right.’ 
Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 
means the right?” Similar to the migration-attitude variable, I averaged values across 
respondents of each state and year to proxy the left-right mean-voter position in each 
country-year. In my sample, this item varies between 4.29 and 6.23 with an average value of 
5.143, which is slightly above the theoretical average. Third, while all countries in my sample 
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are democracies, I still control for variation within this form of government using the polity2 
item from the Polity IV data (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). The average value across all 
units and years still is very close to the theoretical maximum value of 10 as it stands at 9.65. 
Finally, I include three variables that are all taken from the World Bank Development 
Indicators. These three final items are log-transformed and temporally lagged by one year as 
well. First, it is frequently argued that countries’ migration policies are strongly linked to 
their economic development (e.g., Freeman 1995: 886). I use GDP per capita (in current US 
Dollars) to this end, which is defined as the gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
Next to being a measure for the overall economic development in a country, I use the income 
variable as a proxy for client (business) interests. While data for a large set of countries and 
years directly covering client interests’ influence are hardly available, Coates, Heckelman, 
and Wilson (2007; see also Fredriksson and Ujhelyi 2005) show that GDP per capita is an 
important determinant of and strongly correlates with industry interest-group formation. In 
light of this, GDP per capita should be associated with less restrictive policies when 
subscribing to the arguments of those studies suggesting that client interests matter and, 
perhaps, even play a more important role than public opinion (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999; 
Beck and Camarota 2002; Sassen 2008; see also Lahav 2004: Facchini and Mayda 2008). 
Second, population size is likely to be linked to the degree of preference heterogeneity in a 
society, which in turn could affect the public’s demand for migration policies. I rely on a 
country’s midyear total population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship (except for refugees not permanently settled). Finally, I consider the influence 
from unemployment, which I operationalize as the unemployment rate, i.e., the total number 
of unemployed as a share of the total labor force, which is then log-transformed due to its 
16 
 
skewed distribution. The term unemployment as such is defined by the World Bank as 
individuals potentially belonging to the work force, but currently without work and available 
for and seeking employment. Especially when unemployed, people tend to perceive 
migration as less favorable (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Curtis 2014) and policymakers may 
act accordingly. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables I have 
discussed in the research design. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Immigration Policies 314 0.529 0.111 0.306 0.971 
Immigration Policiest-1 314 0.527 0.107 0.314 0.917 
Wy: Immigration Policiest-1 314 0.528 0.013 0.504 0.549 
Public Opiniont-1 314 5.059 0.706 2.928 7.186 
Migrant and Refugee Populationt-1 314 13.868 1.245 10.068 16.308 
Mean Votert-1 314 5.143 0.374 4.291 6.232 
Democracyt-1 314 9.646 0.868 6.000 10.000 
Populationt-1 (ln) 314 16.275 1.161 12.585 18.230 
GDP per capitat-1 (ln) 314 10.350 0.625 8.513 11.542 
Unemployment Ratet-1 (ln) 314 1.692 0.468 0.591 3.262 
 




Table 2 summarizes the main empirical results. In Model 1, the estimation omits the public-
opinion item, but incorporates Migrant and Refugee Population and the controls. Model 2 
then adds Public Opinion, while Model 3 is the full model that additionally considers the 
multiplicative specification of Public Opinion and Migrant and Refugee Population. The 
coefficients in an OLS model can be interpreted directly as marginal effects. Due to the 
inclusion of the temporally lagged dependent variable, however, the coefficient estimates 
reflect the impact in a current year, but I have also calculated the asymptotic long-term effect 
of the of the core variables following Plümper et al. (2005: 336). Moreover, as for the 
interaction in Model 3, its constituent variables’ sizes, signs, or standard errors cannot be 
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directly interpreted. Figure 2 thus depicts the average marginal effect of Public Opinion for 
the values of Migrant and Refugee Population to allow for an intuitive interpretation. 
Table 2. Public Opinion and Migration Policies 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Immigration Policiest-1       0.979***       0.980***       0.969***  
(0.050) (0.049) (0.052) 
Wy: Immigration Policiest-1 0.400 0.460 0.669 
 (0.416) (0.390) (0.424) 
Public Opiniont-1   0.009*   -0.086** 
  (0.005) (0.037) 
Migrant and Refugee Populationt-1 -0.017 -0.015    -0.049** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) 
Public Opiniont-1 * Migrant and Refugee Populationt-1       0.007** 
   (0.003) 
Mean Votert-1 0.004 0.006 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Democracyt-1     -0.019***     -0.019***     -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Populationt-1 (ln)    0.166**       0.161***       0.168*** 
 (0.061) (0.056) (0.053) 
GDP per capitat-1 (ln) -0.030* -0.030*  -0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Unemployment Ratet-1 (ln)    -0.012**    -0.012***    -0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -2.412** -2.433***     -2.125*** 
 (0.914) (0.859) (0.798) 
Obs. 314 314 314 
RMSE 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Temporal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Starting with a discussion of the main explanatory variables, Model 1 demonstrates that 
issue salience, which I capture via the total number of refugees and migrants in a country, 
exerts little impact on the degree of restrictiveness of migration policies on its own. The 
effect of Migrant and Refugee Population is negatively signed, but statistically insignificant. 
When adding Public Opinion to the estimation as in Model 2, this result remains unchanged. 
That said, the item on migration attitudes, Public Opinion, is positively signed and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In substantive terms, raising Public Opinion by 
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one unit leads to a short-term increase in internal-policy restrictiveness of 0.009. Also in the 
short run, increasing Public Opinion from its minimum to its maximum induces a change 
from 0.510 to 0.547 in Immigration Policies. The long-term effect is more substantive: 
asymptotically, immigration restrictions are raised by 0.436 if the public mood towards 
migration becomes worse (i.e., if Public Opinion is increased) by one unit. Yet, the impact of 
public attitude is only barely significant, suggesting that opposite forces might be at work that 
dampen and go against the impact of Public Opinion. 
Model 3 is the fully-specified estimation that incorporates the interaction between Public 
Opinion and Migrant and Refugee Population. Figure 2 summarizes the substantive 
quantities of interest of that model’s core variables. On one hand, for low to medium-sized 
migrant and refugee populations, the effect of Public Opinion is, in fact, statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, in country-years with larger foreign-born populations, 
Public Opinion is positive and highly statistically significant. At the maximum of the 
moderating variable (Migrant and Refugee Population), the average marginal effect of Public 
Opinion is around 0.025 in the short term and 0.810 in the long term. The cut-off value, i.e., 
that value of Migrant and Refugee Population that divides significant from insignificant 
impacts of Public Opinion, is at around 940,000 of foreign-born individuals living in a 
country. In more substantive terms, in countries with rather small migrant and refugee 
populations such as Slovakia or Finland, the public’s generally less favorable view towards 
migration is unlikely to significantly affect domestic immigration regulations and controls. 
Only in states with a large number of migrants and refugees, e.g., the UK, the Netherlands, or 
Germany, population movements are seen as a salient issue – and then the public mood is 





Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects of Public Opinion on Immigration Policies 
 
Note: Graph shows average marginal effects of Public Opinion for various values of Migrant and Refugee 
Population, while holding all other covariates constant at their means; dashed lines signify 90 percent 
confidence intervals; rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of Migrant and Refugee Population; red 
dotted line marks marginal effect of 0. 
 
Linking these results back to the theoretical argument, the analysis provides strong support 
for the conditional claim, i.e., that issue salience moderates the impact of the general, public 
mood on national migration policies; and it thereby also lends support to the argument that in 
cases of low issue salience, the opposing effects stemming from the public views on 
migration and more organized, client interests cancel each other out, leading to the overall 
insignificance of Public Opinion in country-years with rather small foreign-born populations. 
Hence, I demonstrate that there is some validity surrounding the dominant claim in existing 
literature that client interests exert an influence on migration policies, but also that public 
opinion matters, too, working against client interests and even dominating them in high-
salience situations, where the public’s view is activated and governments seek to follow the 
arguably less-organized, but then in terms of size more relevant, critical mass of voters: if 
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public opinion becomes more skeptical and less supportive of migration, policy-makers react; 
but, again, only in cases of issue salience and rather high migrant and refugee populations. 
In terms of the control variables, quite a few of them are associated with significant effects 
despite the inclusion of fixed effects models that make it more difficult to draw inferences 
about time-invariant or slow-moving variables (Plümper and Troeger 2007).7 First, the spatial 
variable, Wy: Immigration Policies, is insignificant, though, providing insufficient support 
for the argument that immigration policies converge more and more toward more liberal 
regulations; this mirrors the pattern depicted in Figure 1 above. Second, Democracy exerts a 
significant and negative impact on the level of restrictiveness of migration policies (see also 
Koopmans and Michalowski 2017: 46). However, the overall substance of the estimated 
effect should not be over-interpreted due to the lack of variance for the regime-type item: all 
countries in the sample are democracies with a mean-polity2 score of 9.65. 
Third, more economically developed states are less restrictive on their immigration 
policies as demonstrated by the negative and significant estimate for GDP per capita in Table 
2. Substantively, in the short term, increasing income by 10 percent is associated with a 
decrease in the level of restrictiveness by 0.002 units in the next year. In general, this pattern 
seems to support the claim, including those studies I pointed to above, that the organized, 
economic interest tends to favor migration due to the various benefits it provides. More 
economically developed and wealthier states are then, unsurprisingly, linked to less 
restrictive policies. The result for Unemployment Rate is at first sight somewhat surprising in 
that higher unemployment rates are associated with less restrictive regulations and controls. 
There are two potential explanations for this. First, Bello (2017: 27), among others, argues 
that “unemployed are not more prejudiced against immigrants than are the employed” (see 
also Lahav 2004: 1168; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). A 
 
7 This is because (almost) time-invariant covariates are highly collinear with fixed effects and their coefficients 
are then either not identified or difficult to estimate with precision. 
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finding that a higher unemployment rate has to be associated with more restrictive policies 
does not necessarily follow from that. In addition, secondly, the pattern I identify might be 
associated with more organized influence stemming from the industrial sector and that 
business actors usually see migration as beneficial (see also Givens and Luedtke 2005: 5). In 
times of unemployment, my finding suggests that industry has successfully lobbied against 
more restrictive laws to, e.g., attract cheap labor from abroad. These are both possible 
explanations for the effect I report for Unemployment Rate, but I leave it to future research to 
examine this interesting pattern in more depth than the scope of my article warrants.  
Finally, Population is, as expected, positively signed and significant. Increasing a 
country’s population by 10 percent is linked to a rise of 0.007 units in migration-policy 
restrictiveness in Model 3. As argued above, population size is likely to be linked to the 
degree of preference heterogeneity in a society, which in turn could affect the public’s 
demand for migration policies. 
 
Conclusion  
The literature has extensively studied the determinants of states’ migration policies, usually 
focusing on client interests that, small in size but well-organized, can influence the direction 
of domestic laws and regulations on immigration significantly (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999; 
Beck and Camarota 2002; Sassen 2008; see also Lahav 2004). Due to the lack of high-
quality, comparative data covering a larger set of countries and years, however, rigorous and 
systematic empirical testing of such and similar claims has been difficult (see also Freeman 
1995: 887; Meyers 2000; Lahav 2004: 1178; Money 2010; Abou-Chadi 2016: 2087), and 
more case-specific and descriptive work informed our understanding. With the release of the 
IMPIC data (Helbling et al. 2017), cross-country analyses became feasible and my research is 
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one of the first studies making use of this source of information for re-assessing the 
determinants of countries’ migration policies from a cross-national perspective. 
In a first step, I presented descriptive patterns, which raised doubts about previous 
arguments on a policy convergence process towards a “liberal bias” (Money 2010), and 
suggested that the virtually exclusive role of client interests may not necessarily be valid. 
Instead, I identified a significant amount of variation in countries’ immigration policies, 
making it plausible that previously overlooked factors may be more influential than existing 
work does suggest. To this end, I primarily focused on public opinion and the general 
public’s view toward migration. On one hand, I developed the claim that democratic 
policymakers have incentives to provide public goods to their domestic audience and to 
implement policies that the electorate sees favorably. The empirical evidence then supported 
this claim, brining-back in public opinion as an important determinant of states’ migration 
regulations and controls. That said, the corresponding item was only barely significant, 
suggesting that other, arguably opposing mechanisms were at work, too – client politics. 
The conditional argument I developed addressed this. While public opinion can influence 
domestic migration policies, we should not rule out the impact of the more organized client 
interests and the results for my income variable underline the importance of this factor 
(Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999; Beck and Camarota 2002; Sassen 2008; see also Lahav 2004: 
Facchini and Mayda 2008). In light of this, I contended that an effect stemming from public 
opinion on migration policies should only materialize when the migration issue is salient – 
that is, when the size of the foreign-born population is large and many migrants and refugees 
reside in a focal country. Only under those circumstances can the general public mood exert 
an influential effect different and independent from client politics as, while mostly 
unorganized, their size can be key for affecting whether a government stays in power or not. 
Ultimately, I therefore combine the influences stemming from client interests and the 
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unorganized public, showing that both are relevant for explaining migration policies, 
although the general public’s interests emerge as the more important, the key influence in 
times of migration being a salient issue. And this rejects earlier conclusions that “public 
opinion in liberal democracies is slower to mobilize and crystalize” (Freeman 1995: 884). 
This research offers important policy implications. First, most importantly, I contribute to 
the larger debate on whether politicians respond to what voters want or if parties and 
governments merely push for their own agenda (see Huber and Powell 1994; Stimson et al. 
1995; Powell 2000). My work presents strong and robust evidence that governments react to 
the preferences of the public, which mirrors, e.g., Ezrow (2010) who finds parties to be vote-
maximizing and center-oriented. Second, given the increasing importance of migration in 
Europe, my work clearly shows that public opinion sets the constraints in which policy can 
develop, offering more practical guidance on how we can explain the form of migration laws. 
The public is important, but interest groups that are usually in favor of more open policies 
now know when and under what circumstances they might have to “do more” in order to be 
effective.  
Third, in light of current plans to implement an EU-wide migration and refugee quota and 
distribution program, my research suggests that this – if well designed and implemented at 
the right time – may crucially influence whether and to what degree the public can influence 
policies and the latter then becoming more restrictive. Effectively re-distributing migrants 
and refugees affects whether population inflows are seen as a salient issue – and whether 
policymakers then have to pay more attention to what the public wants and what it does not. 
Finally, my work offers implications the rise of populist and far-right, anti-immigration party 
platforms as well as the positions that parties assume in times of elections. Consider, for 
example, the 2017 German and Austrian national elections where most parties sought to 
emphasize immigration policymaking in light of increasing issue salience and a public more 
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and more concerned about immigration (see also Thränhardt 1995). Political parties can be 
“nudged” to adopt more restrictive policy platforms (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 104) 
and public opinion in times of issue salience clearly seem a key driving force here. 
In terms of future research, one avenue might be to strengthen our efforts to investigate 
what causes public opinion on migration in the first place. Many studies analyze the factors 
affecting beliefs using individual-level predictors (see, e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; 
Galleo and Pardos-Prado 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). However, it is still unclear 
what shapes public opinion at the macro level. If groups understood this dynamic, public 
opinion could be (purposefully) shifted as a means to catalyze the passage of policy at the 
federal level. Moreover, I treated different types of policies similarly. An interesting next step 
could be to differentiate policies and see whether public opinion leads to a particular set of 
policies being implemented. 8  In addition, Money (2010), among others, distinguishes 
between immigration controls and immigration integration. The question remains whether the 
patterns I have identified here also work in the context of the latter, although data on 
integration efforts are less widely available than on laws and controls. Finally, salience is a 
difficult concept to measure. I eventually opted for the size of the foreign-born population as 
a proxy, but other variables seem equally plausible, e.g., crime or acts of terrorism committed 
by migrants. However, such data are available for some country-years, but not all; and data 
availability for media coverage of migration, another plausible proxy suggested in the 
literature (Epstein and Segal 2000), are even more sparse. More data collection efforts will be 
necessary as a result to address these issues and other important questions in the nexus of 
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